How long it took for Obama to turn How long does it take a mildmannered,
antiwar, black professor
of constitutional law, trained as a
community organizer on the South
Side of Chicago, to become an
enthusiastic sponsor of targeted
assassinations, “decapitation”
strategies and remote-control
bombing of mud houses at the far end
of the globe?
There’s nothing surprising here. As far back as President Woodrow Wilson in the early 20th century, American liberalism has been swift to ex imperial muscle and whistle up the Marines. High explosive has always been in the hormone shot.
The nearest parallel to Obama in eager deference to the bloodthirsty counsels of his counterinsurgency advisors is John F. Kennedy. It is not surprising that bright young presidents relish quick- x, “outside the box” scenarios for victory.
Whether in Vietnam or Afghanistan, the counsels of regular Army generals tends to be drear and unappetizing: vast, costly deployments of troops by the hundreds of thousand, mounting casualties, uncertain prospects for any long-term success — all adding up to dismaying political costs on the home front. Amid Camelot’s dawn in 1961, Kennedy swiftly bent an ear to the counsels of men like Ed Lansdale, a special ops man who wore rakishly the halo of victory over the Communist guerillas in the Philippines and who promised results in Vietnam.
By the time he himself had become the victim of Lee Harvey Oswald’s “decapitation” strategy, brought to successful conclusion in Dealey Plaza, Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963, Kennedy had set in motion the secret counterinsurgency operations, complete with programs of assassination and torture, that turned Southeast Asia and Latin America into charnel houses for the next 20 years.
Another Democrat who strode into the White House with the word “peace” springing from his lips was Jimmy Carter. It was he who rst decreed that “freedom” and the war of terror required a $3.5 billion investment in a secret CIA-led war in Afghanistan, plus the deployment of Argentinean torturers to advise U.S. military teams in counterinsurgency ops in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
( Tough no US president can spend more than a few moments in the Oval O ce scanning his intray the morning after the inaugural ceremonies without okaying the spilling of blood somewhere on the planet, it has to be said that Bill Clinton did display some initial reluctance. “Do we have to do this?” he muttered, as his national security team said that imperial dignity required cruise missile bombardment of Baghdad in 1991 in retaliation for a foiled attack on former President GHW Bush, during a visit to Kuwait.) Obama campaigned on a pledge to “decapitate” al-Qaida, meaning the assassination of its leaders. It was his shorthand way of advertising that he had the right stu . And now, like Kennedy, he’s summoned the exponents of unconventional, shortcut paths to success in that mission. Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal now replaces Gen. David McKiernan as commander of US forces in Afghanistan. McChrystal’s expertise is precisely in assassination and “decapitation.” As commander of the military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) for nearly ve years starting in 2003, McChrystal was in charge of death squad ops, with its best advertised success being the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of al-Qaida in Iraq.
The phrase “sophisticated networks”
Continued on page 22
There’s nothing surprising here. As far back as President Woodrow Wilson in the early 20th century, American liberalism has been swift to ex imperial muscle and whistle up the Marines. High explosive has always been in the hormone shot.
The nearest parallel to Obama in eager deference to the bloodthirsty counsels of his counterinsurgency advisors is John F. Kennedy. It is not surprising that bright young presidents relish quick- x, “outside the box” scenarios for victory.
Whether in Vietnam or Afghanistan, the counsels of regular Army generals tends to be drear and unappetizing: vast, costly deployments of troops by the hundreds of thousand, mounting casualties, uncertain prospects for any long-term success — all adding up to dismaying political costs on the home front. Amid Camelot’s dawn in 1961, Kennedy swiftly bent an ear to the counsels of men like Ed Lansdale, a special ops man who wore rakishly the halo of victory over the Communist guerillas in the Philippines and who promised results in Vietnam.
By the time he himself had become the victim of Lee Harvey Oswald’s “decapitation” strategy, brought to successful conclusion in Dealey Plaza, Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963, Kennedy had set in motion the secret counterinsurgency operations, complete with programs of assassination and torture, that turned Southeast Asia and Latin America into charnel houses for the next 20 years.
Another Democrat who strode into the White House with the word “peace” springing from his lips was Jimmy Carter. It was he who rst decreed that “freedom” and the war of terror required a $3.5 billion investment in a secret CIA-led war in Afghanistan, plus the deployment of Argentinean torturers to advise U.S. military teams in counterinsurgency ops in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
( Tough no US president can spend more than a few moments in the Oval O ce scanning his intray the morning after the inaugural ceremonies without okaying the spilling of blood somewhere on the planet, it has to be said that Bill Clinton did display some initial reluctance. “Do we have to do this?” he muttered, as his national security team said that imperial dignity required cruise missile bombardment of Baghdad in 1991 in retaliation for a foiled attack on former President GHW Bush, during a visit to Kuwait.) Obama campaigned on a pledge to “decapitate” al-Qaida, meaning the assassination of its leaders. It was his shorthand way of advertising that he had the right stu . And now, like Kennedy, he’s summoned the exponents of unconventional, shortcut paths to success in that mission. Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal now replaces Gen. David McKiernan as commander of US forces in Afghanistan. McChrystal’s expertise is precisely in assassination and “decapitation.” As commander of the military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) for nearly ve years starting in 2003, McChrystal was in charge of death squad ops, with its best advertised success being the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of al-Qaida in Iraq.
The phrase “sophisticated networks”
Continued on page 22
